A Quick Reply to Gerety on Byron on Van Til

(Aquascum, aquascumSPAMMENOT at gmail dot com)

Sean Gerety has recently written “The Evisceration of Christian Faith”.

Currently available at: <http://www.trinityfoundation.org/latest.php>

PDF available at: <http://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/245-246-EviscerationofChristianFaith.pdf>

I restrict myself in these present remarks to Gerety’s criticisms of David Byron’s understanding of contradiction.

Gerety claims:

Some Vantilians have recently taken the tack of trying to attribute the “insoluble paradoxes” of Scripture to the inherent insufficiency of Scripture itself… One prominent Vantilian who has been very active on Internet discussion boards in defense of Van Til over the years, David Byron, has championed this particular argument by stating, “God doesn't reveal enough to us for us to see how some of the teachings of Scripture cohere (though God assures us that they do, in the proverbial grand scheme of things) [emphasis is Byron’s].”

Gerety immediately goes on to infer the following from Byron’s statement above:

Therefore, the contradictions of Scripture, which, we’re assured, are not “real,” don’t arise merely because of inherent human limitations due to our “creatureliness,” but also because of the insufficiency of God’s special revelation itself. Scripture is inherently incoherent, that is, Scriptural doctrines do not cohere. Scripture’s alleged insufficiency prevents us from seeing how the teachings of Scripture logically fit together.

Gerety is attempting to show that, on Byron’s view, apparent contradictions in Scripture arise “because of the insufficiency of God’s special revelation itself,” and not “merely because of inherent human limitations”. But, of course, this equivocates on “insufficiency”. Presumably, the Scriptures also do not inform us that Sean Gerety exists, or that Gordon Clark believed that persons are propositions, but they are not “insufficient” on that account. Just because the Scriptures give us some information does not mean they give us all information whatsoever. Since “sufficiency” is a teleologically-oriented term (sufficient for what, exactly?), whether or not what someone says about the Scriptures implies that the Scriptures are “insufficient” depends on what the Scriptures are supposed to be sufficient for. Preserving Aunt May’s recipes? Fixing my Toyota Celica? Or what? Thus, Gerety first has to make the case that the Scriptures ought to “reveal enough for us to see how some of the teachings of Scripture cohere,” before he can validly conclude that anyone who says otherwise denies Scriptural sufficiency. And since Gerety buys into the Scripturalist program of the Trinity Foundation, Gerety has to make this case from propositions of Scripture and propositions validly deducible from propositions of Scripture, and these alone (at least if he’s going to satisfy John Robbins with his argumentation). This looks like a tall order to me, but Gerety is free to try. Otherwise, his opening criticism of Byron is just a non sequitur. Gordon Clark would not be pleased.

Beyond this, what Gerety identifies as two sources of apparent contradiction are really the same. Gerety wants to contrast “inherent human limitations” with “the insufficiency of God’s special revelation”. The problem here is that the latter wouldn’t be the case unless the former was also the case, so that this alleged Scriptural insufficiency just is a statement about inherent human limitations. Let’s say that Scripture doesn’t “reveal enough for us to see how some of the teachings of Scripture cohere.” Would it follow that this fact about Scripture is a cause of human beings not being able to see how some of the teachings of Scripture cohere? Of course not. That would only follow if we have “inherent human limitations due to our creatureliness”. Presumably, it wouldn’t follow for an omniscient interpreter. So Byron isn’t positing the Scriptures as the source of apparent contradiction. Rather, human ignorance is the source of apparent contradiction, when considering various Scriptural propositions. So the notion that Byron finds a defect in Scripture is erroneous for this reason as well. Gerety names this section of his essay “The Insufficiency of Scripture,” but unfortunately he hasn’t been able to pin this theological sin on Byron.

Gerety continues by quoting the definitions which Byron uses to address the issue of apparent contradiction:

Some sets of propositions constitute apparent contradictions. Among the sets of apparent contradictions, some are actual contradictions and some merely seem that way. Call the actual contradictions "Class-A Apparent Contradictions" and call the ones that merely seem contradictory "Class-B Apparent Contradictions." Class-A and Class-B combined constitute the set of all apparent contradictions.

Gerety comments:

Notice that Byron begins by calling actual contradictions “apparent.” This confuses the situation, rather than clarifies it.

No, it is Gerety who does this. Both actual contradictions and apparent contradictions appear to us to be contradictions. Is this not obvious? So both Class-A and Class-B contradictions are apparent contradictions, in that they each appear to us to be contradictory. It’s just that Class-A contradictions are real contradictions as well as apparent, whereas Class-B contradictions are merely apparent contradictions (and not real contradictions).

It seems extremely odd for Gerety to claim that labeling an apparent contradiction ‘apparent’ is somehow confusing. Perhaps Gerety is of the opinion that an actual contradiction would never appear that way to us. Or perhaps Gerety is of the opinion that an apparent contradiction would never appear that way to us. So much the worse for Gerety argument, since these previous two claims are evident truths. (Gerety could prove me wrong here, by providing for us an actual contradiction that doesn’t appear to be contradictory.) My money is on the option that Byron himself describes, the option that says that all apparent contradictions whatsoever can be neatly categorized into two types: those that appear to be and are real contradictions (Class-A), and those that appear to be but are not real contradictions (Class-B). This clarifies the situation by noting that real as well as apparent contradictions appear to us to be contradictory. It would be the denial of this that would lead to confusion.

The reader will have to go to Gerety’s post to see Byron’s subsequent ‘dentist analogy’ in full. But I’d just like to point out that Gerety’s main argument against Byron at this juncture is based on an obvious misreading of Byron. Gerety says that Byron’s dentist analogy

rests on an obvious equivocation in at least two terms: “stab” and “face,” thus violating Byron’s own rule that “all the key terms [must] have the same definition.” Because of this equivocation, the statements a’, b’, and c’, do not result in any conclusion.

The reason why this is an obvious misreading is that Byron appeals to lack of equivocation as a means of identifying Class-A contradictions, not Class-B contradictions. As Byron himself puts it, when commenting on Class-A contradictions:

If, and only if, all the key terms in statement [a] have the same definition in statement [b], then we would want to insist that [a] and [b] are directly contradictory, and that the reason they appear contradictory is precisely that they are so.

Byron’s whole point is that because there is equivocation in the dentist analogy, it should be classified as Class-B rather than Class-A. But Gerety somehow thinks that pointing out the equivocation in the dentist analogy means it cannot be classified as Class-B. This is exceeding strange, to point out what your opponent has already pointed out, and think it is a revelation to your readers.

Gerety continues:

If all Scripture ends in apparent contradictions, then in what sense can all Scripture be profitable for doctrine, reproof, correction, etc.? We could not even judge, much less correct, the actions of a “face stabber,” given Byron’s scenario.

Byron, of course, addresses the issue of when we are and are not warranted in appealing to mystery, as a way “to construct a non-contradictory model of scripture's teachings”. Where does Byron address this? In the rest of the post to which Gerety refers (cf. the final eight paragraphs or so of <http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/vantil-list/archive-Aug-1999/msg00056.html>). Isn’t it just extremely strange that Gerety presumes to critique someone’s post to an email list, and doesn’t bother to interact with those portions of the post that are most relevant to the critique being offered?

In addition, Byron provides a detailed answer to some of Gerety’s deepest concerns, in a post which occurs just one day after the post Gerety decided to (selectively) evaluate. Cf. <http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/vantil-list/archive-Aug-1999/msg00067.html>. This post addresses in further detail the question of how one recognizes genuine instances of Class-B apparent contradictions in Scripture (an issue Gerety claims Byron doesn’t address). Moreover, in that same context, Byron defends the traditional (and non-paradoxical) Reformed understanding of the relations between justification, faith, and works, which tends to undermine Gerety’s conspiracy theory that Van Til’s views on theological paradox are the root of Shepherd’s aberrant views on justification.

This reader should be forgiven for thinking that Gerety either hasn’t consulted or hasn’t reflected upon the materials which are most relevant to discerning Byron’s position on apparent contradiction. This would seem to be a vital prerequisite to publishing one’s assessments of Byron’s views (especially in an official edition of the Trinity Review). Just as a helpful reminder, if Gerety wants to know what David Byron has actually posted on a particular topic, the archives of the Van Til List are open and searchable.

-- Aquascum